This paper introduces a research agenda to extend deterrence theory to address the increasing diversity of means available for coercion. Deterrence was first explicitly formulated as a strategic concept during the Cold War because defense against nuclear weapons appeared futile. Questions of resolve and credibility assumed central importance while the choice of means became secondary on the assumption that they would be nuclear, or at least would not affect deterrence success or failure. Increasing opportunities for aggression, particularly in space and cyberspace, and interdependencies among coercive options brings new urgency to the question of means. Complexity generates uncertainty, undermining both the simple logic of earlier deterrence frameworks and the credibility of policies founded on them. "Cross domain deterrence" seeks to counter threats in one arena by relying on unlike capabilities in another area where deterrence may prove more effective. How, for instance, might threats to cyberspace or space be countered by sea power or nuclear weapons, or even non-military tools such as access to markets or normative regimes? The increasing complexity of capabilities, linkages, and actors in the world poses opportunities and challenges that would benefit from an evolution of deterrence theory and practice.
Introduction
"When there is mutual fear," Thucydides observed, "men think twice before they make aggressions on one another."
1 Threats of punishment have been used to deter war since antiquity, but deterrence as a precise theoretical concept and a paramount element of national security policy only emerged in the nuclear era. States in the Cold War developed weapons they dared not use but which they needed to discourage aggression. A vast literature developed from the effort to understand bilateral nuclear bargaining as well as more baroque elaborations on the credibility of nuclear guarantees to allies, incentives for conventional war in the shadow of nuclear deterrence, and the reliability of command and control systems. The overriding focus of strategic theory was still rather narrow, however: the avoidance of collective nuclear suicide with a known opponent. This work produced broad consensus on the logic, if not the practice, of deterrence.
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The existential bargaining relationship envisioned by classical deterrence theory contrasts with the technological and political challenges of the contemporary security environment. Nuclear and conventional military forces continue to improve and proliferate even as new challenges emerge such as cyber warfare and pervasive surveillance, anti-satellite and space-based weapons, autonomous robotics (drones), information operations to shape opinions and catalyze dissent, and innovations still barely imagined. Some of these developments carry the potential for extremely disruptive effects on par with weapons of mass destruction, but many of them open up options for lower intensity or even nonlethal effects. A wide range of political actors may have the ability or motivation to exploit emerging capabilities, from rising powers like China to regional spoilers like 1 Jowett 1900, §4.62 2 Freedman 2004 notes "how complicated a theoretical tangle developed around deterrence even during the cold war, a period of unusual clarity and continuity in international affairs" (117). Classic works include Wohlstetter 1958; Brodie 1959 , Kahn 1960 , Schelling 1960 and 1966 , Snyder 1961 , Jervis 1976 , 1989 , Waltz 1979 . Reviews of this literature include Kaplan 1983 , Trachtenberg 1991 , Freedman 1986 , Long 2008 Russia or Iran, domestic factions of weak allies like Pakistan and Iraq, anarchist movements like Anonymous or terrorist groups, and the list goes on. The resulting complexity of means, linkages between them, and actors with access to them need not necessarily result in greater absolute levels of danger, but it does present numerous theoretical and practical challenges. 3 Complexity itself has become a strategic problem.
Complexity can create confusion, but also opportunities. Some of the confusion arises from uncertainty about whether new opportunities advantage stronger or weaker actors, status quo hegemons or rising challengers, nation states or lone terrorists, etc. It is possible that great powers with more experience and resources will be able to better integrate emerging capabilities to augment and enhance their power. It is also possible, and widely feared, that emerging threats crossing over established jurisdictional, environmental, or conceptual boundaries can undermine conventional military advantages, or even undermine a national nuclear deterrent. Real and imagined threats range across traditional physical environments (land, sea, air, and space) as well as the artificial construct of cyberspace, all described as war-fighting "domains" by the Pentagon.
The notion of a "domain" can also be considered more generally in terms of policy jurisdiction, infrastructure ownership, command authority, or arenas of technocratic expertise. Indeed, in the extreme, each new capability or tactic involves an area of application and each interacts with existing friendly and enemy capabilities to augment or possibly degrade these capabilities.
Domains are as much convenient categories for conceptualization, debate and training as discrete places with clearly delineated boundaries. For our purposes we focus on a domain as a pathway or means for coercion that is different from other means in important respects so that one may 3 For a survey of emerging and potential threats see National Intelligence Council 2012 compare interactions between actors according to how "like" confronts "like" and, increasingly, how "unlike" confronts "unlike."
The mobilization of capabilities in one domain to counter those in another, e.g., using air power to retaliate for terrorism or cyber disruption of military command and control, are "cross domain" interactions. By extension, "Cross domain deterrence" (CDD) involves using capabilities We first situate the need for CDD in the historical evolution of complexity in the means of coercion. We also clarify the historical continuities and novelties of CDD as a concept. We then explain how CDD differs from classical deterrence. Following this, we parse the complexity of CDD into more tractable questions about threat capabilities, economic and infrastructural interdependence, and the variety of state and non-state adversaries who have access to these capabilities. In something of a surprise given the complexity of the subject matter, we are able to
show that considerable intellectual terrain can be productively surveyed and mastered with relatively simple conceptual tools.
Expanding the Means of Coercion
In the aftermath of Hiroshima, as Bernard Brodie famously pointed out, nuclear weapons made war fighting suicidal even as they facilitated strategic deterrence. With intercontinental missiles, survivable submarines, and massive arsenals, defense against nuclear weapons was impossible, or at least prohibitively risky. Strategists turned instead to deterrence and articulated its logic in detail.
Deterrence was not a new phenomenon, but the demand for theory about it was new. CDD is also 8 We are on the increasing tip of the "hockey stick" of industrial innovation and change. Nothing grows exponentially forever, of course. The top of the S-curve in this phase of macro-evolutionary "punctuated equilibrium" is still ahead of us. That new long-term steady state-or maybe systemic collapse-will no doubt introduce different strategic challenges. But we're not there yet. A sustained rise in socio-technical complexity is widely recognized to be a key historical trend in the evolution of industrial societies more broadly, increasing the ability to make money, and to make war. Industrialization increases the resources available to states and other actors, but it also necessitates the development of new institutions and technologies required to manage increasing scales of production and coordination. These changes in turn create increasing returns to the control of controls. Beninger 1986, and the literature on endogenous growth more generally. 10 The front structure of a ship (near the bow) is still called a "forecastle," strange vocabulary for something at sea. Armor can provide fires and protection, even as it is vulnerable to other arms such as artillery and tactical aviation. Similarly, a naval carrier battle group uses different classes of ships, submarines, and aircraft to project power against even formidable technological defenses afloat and ashore.
The combination of cover, concealment, movement, suppressive fire, tactical initiative, and cooperation amongst branches and services made the modern system of offense especially effective on the highly lethal battlefields of the twentieth century. Yet adoption and eventual 11 Biddle 2004 diffusion of this innovation in strategy and organization lagged the introduction of technology.
Enormous challenges were involved in mastering the inherent complexity and in accumulating the human and organizational capital required for combined arms warfare. Another form of complexity management complements and enables force employment complexity, namely the engineering systems integration needed to design and field sophisticated weaponry. 
Toward a Logic of Cross Domain Deterrence
Deterrence theory rests on the notion of political bargaining between broadly rational actors. It is desirable to retain this paradigm, at least for the present. 13 Like classical deterrence, a theory of CDD should link the technical ability to harm with the political utility of aggression.
Unfortunately, most of the discussion of CDD and associated challenges in cyberspace, space or elsewhere tends to focus on the technological "cross domain" problem rather than on the strategic "deterrence" problem. Considerable attention has been given to the expanding frontier of novel threats against which the U.S. and other nations must defend as a result of the eroding global commons, new offensive capabilities, pervasive interconnectivity, etc. 14 Defense policymakers have also begun to explore the considerable practical challenges of optimizing cross domain responses at the operational level of war, e.g., in the U.S. "AirSea Battle" concept to respond to Chinese area denial and new bureaucratic constructs like U.S. Cyber Command. 15 Less attention has been devoted to the strategic logic underpinning the behavior of different actors with novel threats, i.e., how leaders and commanders link means and ends to achieve their best advantage.
Deterrence, by definition, involves the use of threats to dissuade adversaries from taking unwanted action. An effective deterrent policy must send a clear and predictable message: "cross this boundary and expect these consequences." Uncertainty about the parameters of the boundary, the nature of the punishment, the credibility of the threat, or reassurance that compliance will avoid punishment each diminish the potency of deterrence. Ambiguity can improve deterrence only in cases where the credibility of an extreme consequence like mutual nuclear suicide is inherently 13 It is possible to take a different position about how humans perceive and reason. This has not been practiced widely with classical deterrence, in part because deterrence theory relies on the notion of a motivating quid pro quo. We are certainly not opposed to exploring the implications of non-rational agency, but this complicates the concept for now and makes it more difficult to connect our work with classical theory without clearly improving predictions. 14 Representative surveys include Jasper 2010, Denmark and Mulvenon 2010 15 Inter alia, Schwartz and Greenert 2011; van Tol et al 2010; Lynn 2010 dubious and must be bolstered by some probabilistic risk of unintended accident. Schelling's "threat that leaves something to chance" thus allows the coercer to heighten the risk of an undesirable outcome that it can't rationally choose with certainty. 16 While a predictable deterrent policy does not guarantee success-a challenger may still value the expected political gains of an action over the potential risk of punishment-a policy that does not enable opponents to predict the national response makes deterrence failure much more likely.
Effective CDD strategies would seek to restore the credibility of deterrent threats as challengers develop new ways to evade existing deterrence regimes. CDD can and should look to familiar deterrence principles. What differs is the technological and political context of bargaining.
Traditional deterrence theory is agnostic about means (usually assuming the means are nuclear), but choice among means is essential for CDD. The possible combinations of threat capabilities, infrastructural and institutional linkages, and actors with various motivations to act or to be deterred by a given threat generate uncertainty that itself becomes a critical challenge.
Much scholarship on deterrence still focuses primarily on nuclear weapons with little consideration of the interaction between other means of influence (especially cyber and space, both critical for the employment of nuclear forces today and which, many believe, may offer strategic substitutes for nuclear capabilities in some circumstances). 17 The literature on the interaction between nuclear and conventional forces offers some useful starting points, for instance the idea that nuclear stability could incentivize conventional instability. 18 Similarly, because cross-domain capabilities considerably expand opportunities for disruption and influence rather than outright 16 Schelling 1960 , deterrence is the use of threats to dissuade an adversary from taking an action in the future while compellence is the use of threats to persuade an adversary to stop an action already underway. The relationship between the two is likely to be complicated in CDD.
the vast literature on strategy, but there is also considerable new ground to explore by explicitly focusing on the persistent increase of socio-technical complexity over time.
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An Agenda for Analyzing Strategic Complexity
The fundamental problem of CDD is to navigate the combinatoric complexity of increasing capabilities, linkages, and actors. Complexity is the very problem which gives rise to CDD.
Analysis of CDD should break down and make sense of this complexity. Whereas traditional deterrence theory focuses on bilateral bargaining with nuclear threats, our approach to CDD systematically relaxes three assumptions. First, it increases the range of available capabilities to make symmetric or asymmetric moves possible in the bargaining process. Second, it increases the linkages between these capabilities, to include interdependence in their production and exchange, interconnection through shared infrastructure, and the combination of capabilities in a portfolio of options. Third, it increases the number and types of actors to consider balancing, alliances and extended deterrence, principal-agency and other contracting relationships. These relaxations can be analyzed separately and then synthesized subsequently.
In policy discourse on CDD we can discern some emerging conventional wisdom in each of these three relaxations. These fashionable yet inchoate ideas provide us with a jumping off point from which to develop a much more general, analytically rigorous, and empirically testable theoretical framework. Existing points of departure also help to ensure that the fruits of basic scientific research are nevertheless capable of yielding implications with direct policy relevance. The three dimensions of complexity in Table 1 There already exists a rich social science literature to draw upon in each of the three areas above. Questions about capabilities, linkages, and actors are hardly new, and in many ways are the conceptual core of political science. Indeed, a key component of efficient research is to leverage existing concepts so there is no need for researchers to start from scratch or "reinvent the wheel."
What is new is the integration of each concept and accompanying knowledge into a common scientific research program for CDD. These interrelated concepts should build on one another in a modular yet cumulative process. Modularity enables us to isolate important factors and mechanisms. The cumulation of knowledge allows us to apply the insights gained in one stage to the next. Table 2 summarizes this approach by highlighting research questions at the technical/operational and political/strategic levels. As discussed previously, these must be distinguished in terms of technical possibility and bargaining utility in order to avoid technological determinism and to emphasize the political roots of objective and in strategy. Research into CDD should develop analytically rigorous theory to answer these questions and to begin the process of empirical and computational evaluation. Systematic investigation can progressively increase complexity by multiplying the asymmetric capabilities available, types of relationships connecting actors, and the number of actors engaged. Yet beyond a few actors and relationships interactions become too complex and convoluted to deal with analytically. Indeed, we do not want overly complex theory, particularly given the complexity of subjects and relationships already in the problem of CDD, since the object is to clarify and make practical the application of key insights. At the same time complexity implies an even greater need for careful empirical assessment, to ensure that theory is a valid and to assess the potency of predictions.
Empirical assessment in a period of transition is strained by the need to infer from incomplete data or from imperfect analogies. We advocate the pursuit of two complementary and overlapping strategies. First, to the degree possible, we can use the past to predict the future, basing assessments of the drivers of CDD on contexts and behaviors that have already come to pass. The increasing complexity of combined arms warfare is one such example. We can also assess the effects of asymmetry, interdependence and multi-polarity separately, and in some cases jointly, on existing interstate conflict data (wars, disputes, crises, and armed conflicts) covering the universe of interstate cases and extending back to 1816. A second strategy is to simulate complex bargaining among actors, extrapolating from historical data, in order to better understand the nature and evolultion of dynamics in dyadic, regional and system behavior.
Considerable information is already available about the causes of war and peace among nations and between states and non-state actors that can be applied in the context of CDD.
Extensive qualitative and quantitative studies have examined factors like regime type, proximity, capabilities, wealth, trade and other variables. These data and insights can form the backdrop for our tests. The trick, as always, is not to examine everything, but to develop tests in a context where results are indicative. It is highly unlikely that everything will be different in the future. Indeed, our view of CDD, as we have already implied, is that it is the fruition of processes that have been developing and increasing in salience over many centuries. The fact that they have now become important enough to be the focus of analytical and operational analysis, rather than treated as "noise" is simply evidence of their maturation, not their discontinuity from the past.
The basic "bricks and mortar" of our theoretical perspective is again in reach by conceiving of social institutions as a type of bargaining equilibrium between agents in a political system and war as a type of bargaining failure. There are countless institutions which regulate social behavior in any system, some formal and some informal. When novel technological and political developments alter participants' bargaining power, actors may be tempted to renegotiate; renegotiation can lead to war. 27 The disruptive technologies of CDD which affect capabilities, linkages, and actors are precisely the kinds of developments destined to prompt bargaining failures.
Therefore, by analyzing complex bargaining directly in our exploration of CDD, we have the potential to show how conflicts at different scales are related, perhaps through relationships of restraint rooted in interdependence or escalatory spirals.
Why CDD? Why Now?
The world is steadily growing more complex, and CDD is becoming more relevant. Because of increasing means for coercion and the uncertainty the resulting complexity creates, a conceptual understanding of CDD has become a limiting factor for national security strategy. It is easier to fund technology for offense or defense than to understand incentives and even strategy. The 27 Wagner 2007 complexity of these technologies makes their strategic implications ever harder to comprehend.
China's rise makes CDD particularly salient, but it also matters for relations with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and NATO, to say nothing of non-governmental organizations. Yet if CDD is becoming harder, the advantages that stem from getting it right are growing exponentially.
A natural question to ask is whether CDD is fundamentally destabilizing. Many people certainly think so. Emerging technologies seem, by some accounts, to advantage opportunistic attackers, weaker actors, and challenges to the status quo. Interdependent infrastructures create grave vulnerabilities for all, especially the most advanced industrialized states. The growing number of potential threats from ever more state and non-state actors complicates the choice of strategy. However, the opposite might be the case. Some asymmetric capabilities reinforce the status quo, while economic interdependene, a form of complexity common in recent times, is generally thought to be pacifying. More and more actors have a stake in the current system. We need better theory and policy approaches to resolve or at least clarify these controversies.
In short, this research program asks how increasing technological and political complexity affects coercive strategy. What pitfalls and opportunities does CDD offer as deterrence can be pursued in an ever greater number of ways? What is the strategic logic of CDD, even for domains
that have yet to be invented (or imagined)? The basic challenge of the research project is to render the increasing complexity of CDD analytically tractable.
CDD is an emerging contemporary defense policy problem that appears destined to have major implications for the future in thinking about deterrence and military operations. Just as mastering combined arms operations assigned "winners" in combat in the twentieth century and allowed the United States to wield an affordable and effective form of dominance as hegemon, so too making sense of CDD will allow some actors to exercise influence in the future. Given that global complexity is continually increasing, successful CDD will become even more critical and challenging. Declining U.S. defense budgets elevate the importance of strategy: while the U.S.
cannot afford to defend everywhere, it can still deter. There will be technological changes that create new threats in the future that are hard to imagine now; instead of reacting piecemeal to each new threat or capability, a strategic policy designed explicitly to confront the problem of continuously increasing socio-technical complexity would make it easier to accommodate, even anticipate, novel threats. To design such a strategy, policymakers must make sense of CDD. The question is whether they will be forced to do so intuitively or whether they can be guided by a theoretically-grounded strategic logic.
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